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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This matter comes on before this Court on appeal from 
the District Court‘s December 20, 2010 order granting Chevron 
Corporation (Chevron), and two of its attorneys, Rodrigo Pérez 
Pallares and Ricardo Reis Veiga (collectively with Chevron ―the 
Chevron applicants‖), discovery from attorney Joseph C. Kohn 
and his law firm, Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C. (KSG), pursuant to 
discovery applications that the Chevron applicants filed under 
28 U.S.C. § 1782.  Section 1782 provides that ―[t]he district 
court of the district in which a person resides or is found may 
order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a 
document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or 
international tribunal,‖ subject to the express limitation that ―[a] 
person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement 
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or to produce a document or other thing in violation of any 
legally applicable privilege.‖  28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).   
The underlying foreign litigation giving rise to the 
section 1782 applications is an environmental class action in 
Lago Agrio, Ecuador (the Lago Agrio litigation), that the 
inhabitants of the Oriente region of eastern Ecuador (the 
Ecuadorian plaintiffs) brought alleging that Texaco Petroleum 
Company (TexPet), a subsidiary of Texaco, Inc. (Texaco), 
which merged with Chevron in 2001, contaminated the area and 
caused significant health problems for its residents.  As we 
explain below, Kohn and KSG have been involved for many 
years on behalf of the Ecuadorian plaintiffs in the underlying 
litigation in both legal and financial capacities.  The Chevron 
applicants sought section 1782 discovery for use in the Lago 
Agrio litigation itself, criminal proceedings arising from 
TexPet‘s Ecuadorian activities that have been instituted against 
Pérez and Veiga
1
 in Ecuador, and an arbitration that Chevron 
initiated against the Republic of Ecuador with the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
pursuant to the United States-Ecuador Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (BIT).
2
   
                                                 
1
 We refer to Rodrigo Pérez Pallares as Pérez throughout this 
opinion in accordance with his brief, as he is of Spanish descent. 
 We were informed at oral argument that Ricardo Reis Veiga is 
Brazilian and, being of Portuguese descent, goes by Veiga.  
 
2
 The Ecuadorian plaintiffs are not a party to the BIT arbitration, 
though they have an interest in the outcome of those 
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The Ecuadorian plaintiffs and the Republic of Ecuador 
(collectively ―appellants‖), both of whom intervened in the 
District Court in this case, contend that the Court erred in 
granting the Chevron applicants‘ section 1782 discovery 
applications and assert several challenges to the Court‘s rulings. 
 The Ecuadorian plaintiffs‘ primary challenge is to the Court‘s 
conclusion that, ―[t]o the extent that any privilege or immunity 
from disclosure would otherwise apply to some or all of the 
discovery sought by Chevron or individual applicants, [Pérez] 
and Veiga, any such privilege has been waived by public 
disclosure and does not apply to any documents related to the 
Lago Agrio Litigation[.]‖  In re Application of Chevron Corp., 
Nos. 10-MC-208 and 10-MC-209, 2010 WL 5173279, at *11 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2010).  Specifically, the Ecuadorian plaintiffs 
contend that the Court misstated the law regarding waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege, causing it to omit fairness 
considerations in its analysis, and that consequently its ruling 
that the attorney-client privilege was waived for all documents 
in Kohn‘s file related to the Lago Agrio litigation primarily on 
the basis of the filming of the documentary Crude, which 
chronicled the Lago Agrio litigation, was too broad.  They also 
argue ―that the presence of strangers‖ during attorney meetings 
prevented the privilege from ever attaching to what otherwise 
might have been privileged information.  Ecuadorian plaintiffs‘ 
br. at 23. n.7.  As will be seen, the ―presence of strangers‖ 
during attorney meetings being filmed for Crude is the critical 
factor in the disposition of this appeal.  The Republic of Ecuador 
challenges the District Court‘s conclusion that it ―failed to 
establish its right to assert the community-of-interest privilege 
                                                                                                             
proceedings. 
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with respect to the documents and deposition testimony sought 
in this case.‖  In re Application of Chevron Corp., 2010 WL 
5173279, at *11.  We, however, will have no need to address 
that issue.   
Inasmuch as we hold that the communications filmed for 
Crude and its outtakes were not covered by the attorney-client 
privilege when made due to the presence of the filmmakers at 
the time of the communications, we will reverse the District 
Court‘s orders because the public disclosure of non-privileged 
communications does not lead to a subject matter waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege for communications covered by the 
privilege.  We, nevertheless, will remand the matter to the 
District Court so that it may consider the Chevron applicants‘ 
contention that certain communications in Kohn‘s file are 
discoverable pursuant to the crime-fraud exception to the 
attorney-client privilege.  
  
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This is our second encounter with a section 1782 
discovery request relating to the Lago Agrio litigation, and 
because much of the background factual information in this case 
is the same as that we recounted in our earlier encounter in In re 
Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2011), we only will 
outline that background information briefly before setting forth 
in more detail those facts essential to the resolution of this 
appeal.   
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The Ecuadorian plaintiffs initially brought a class action 
suit against Texaco in 1993 in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York (the Aguinda case), 
claiming that pollution from oil exploration and extraction 
activities had harmed individuals inhabiting the Oriente region 
of Ecuador and damaged the natural ecosystem in the area.  
After years of litigation, the court dismissed the Aguinda case in 
2002 on forum non conveniens grounds, based in part on 
Texaco‘s representations that the Ecuadorian judiciary was 
impartial and free from corruption and that the Ecuadorian 
courts could provide a fair and appropriate forum in which to 
resolve the dispute in the Aguinda case.  See Aguinda v. 
Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 474-80 (2d Cir. 2002).    
In 2003, after dismissal of the Aguinda case, the 
Ecuadorian plaintiffs instituted the Lago Agrio litigation against 
Chevron in Ecuador.
3
  On February 14, 2011, shortly before we 
heard oral argument on this appeal, the Lago Agrio Court issued 
a comprehensive opinion adjudicating the case and entering 
judgment in United States dollars against Chevron, calculating 
the compensatory damages at $8.646 billion.  The breakdown of 
the damages award was as follows:  $5.396 billion for soil 
remediation; $1.4 billion for health care costs; $800 million for 
deaths due to cancer; $600 million for groundwater remediation; 
$200 million for damage to the ecosystem; $150 million for 
drinking water remediation; and $100 million for damages to 
indigenous culture.  The judgment also included a provision 
                                                 
3
 The parties in the Aguinda case and the Lago Agrio litigation 
were not identical. 
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granting an equivalent $8.646 billion in punitive damages 
payable if Chevron did not issue a public apology within 15 days 
of entry of the judgment.
4
   
Both Chevron and the Ecuadorian plaintiffs have 
signaled their intent to appeal from the judgment entered in the 
Lago Agrio litigation.  It is our understanding that the 
Ecuadorian appellate court will exercise de novo review over 
both the Lago Agrio Court‘s findings of fact and conclusions of 
law.  Moreover, the Ecuadorian plaintiffs‘ litigation team 
produced a memorandum in response to a Chevron section 1782 
application in the Southern District of New York seeking 
discovery from Steven Donziger, the Ecuadorian plaintiffs‘ lead 
American attorney, stating that ―during the pendency of that 
appeal, the judgment is not deemed enforceable under 
Ecuadorian law, and thus, would not appear to be enforceable 
anywhere else.‖5   Chevron Supp. App. II at 480.   The 
Ecuadorian plaintiffs‘ attorneys‘ memo further explained that 
―[b]eyond this initial level of appeal, it is our understanding that 
Chevron would be required to post an appellate bond equivalent 
to 100% of the judgment[,]‖ and for that reason the Ecuadorian 
plaintiffs‘ attorneys believe that if the Ecuadorian plaintiffs 
prevail on the initial appeal, ―it seems likely that Chevron will 
pursue no further recourse in Ecuador.‖  Id.  
                                                 
4
 We are not aware whether Chevron has issued a public 
apology. 
 
5
 Even if the appeals do not stay enforcement of the judgment or 
the appellate standard of review is not de novo, our result on this 
appeal would not be different. 
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As the Lago Agrio litigation progressed, Chevron‘s 
opinion of the Ecuadorian courts changed dramatically, and 
Chevron now contends that the Ecuadorian judiciary is rife with 
corruption and that a fair trial was not possible in the Lago 
Agrio litigation.  Assessing that its litigation prospects in 
Ecuador were not promising, correctly as it turned out, on 
November 23, 2009, Chevron commenced the BIT arbitration 
against the Republic of Ecuador, seeking a declaration that any 
judgment the Lago Agrio Court entered would be unenforceable 
by reason of the judgment having been fraudulently obtained.  
Furthermore, Chevron asserted that there is corruption within 
the Ecuadorian judiciary and that the Ecuadorian government 
interfered in the judicial process in the Lago Agrio litigation.
6
  
The BIT arbitral panel, which we understand is composed of 
two private lawyers and a law professor, held a hearing on 
February 6, 2011, and on February 9, 2011, issued interim 
measures ordering the Republic of Ecuador to take all measures 
at its disposal to suspend the enforcement or recognition of any 
judgment entered in the Lago Agrio litigation both inside and 
outside of Ecuador.  We are unaware of whether the Republic of 
Ecuador has taken any steps to implement the provisions in the 
order.          
                                                 
6
 Though not a party to the BIT arbitration, the Ecuadorian 
plaintiffs filed suit in the Southern District of New York seeking 
a stay of the BIT arbitration.  The Republic of Ecuador also 
moved for a stay of the BIT arbitration, but the district court 
declined to issue the stay, and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit has affirmed its ruling on appeal. 
 See Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., No. 10-1020-cv, -- 
F.3d --, 2011 WL 905118 (2d Cir. March 17, 2011).   
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Perhaps regretting its earlier efforts to have the Aguinda 
case dismissed in the Southern District of New York, Chevron 
filed a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO) suit against Donziger and other attorneys that 
represented the Ecuadorian plaintiffs, though not including 
Kohn or KSG as defendants, in the Southern District of New 
York on February 1, 2011.  As part of that suit Chevron is 
seeking a declaration that the Lago Agrio judgment is not 
entitled to recognition or enforcement outside of Ecuador 
because the Ecuadorian plaintiffs‘ attorneys procured the 
judgment by their fraudulent conduct, and, somewhat ironically 
given its past representations in the Southern District of New 
York, because the Ecuadorian legal system is not impartial and 
does not provide litigants due process of law.  On March 7, 
2011, the district court in the Southern District of New York 
granted Chevron‘s motion for a worldwide preliminary 
injunction barring the Ecuadorian plaintiffs from enforcing the 
Lago Agrio judgment.  See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 
Civ. 0691, -- F. Supp. 2d --, 2011 WL 778052 (S.D.N.Y. March 
7, 2011).    
During the course of the Lago Agrio litigation Chevron 
has filed a series of section 1782 discovery applications in 
federal courts across the United States seeking information 
related to that litigation and to its contention that the Ecuadorian 
plaintiffs, through their attorneys, have been involved in 
fraudulent conduct.
7
  Specifically, the Chevron applicants 
                                                 
7
 According to the brief of the Republic of Ecuador, the Chevron 
applicants have submitted ―twenty-three similar requests for 
discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, the Republic has submitted 
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contend that the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and their representatives 
conspired to ghostwrite reports entered into evidence in the 
Lago Agrio litigation by purportedly neutral and independent 
scientists, and also surreptitiously were instrumental in the 
institution of criminal charges against Pérez and Veiga in 
Ecuador. 
Before instituting these section 1782 proceedings, 
Chevron sent Kohn and KSG a letter on November 8, 2010, 
threatening to institute the proceedings against them.  Kohn and 
KSG responded by filing a complaint for declaratory relief in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania on November 12, 2010, because they perceived 
that they faced the dilemma of either ―choos[ing] not to resist 
the forthcoming [section 1782] Application and disclos[ing] the 
materials sought, but risk[ing] suit from its former clients[,]‖ or 
―oppos[ing] the Application and withhold[ing] the requested 
materials, but risk[ing] continued irreparable harm to its 
reputation as a result of scandalous, totally unfounded, and false 
allegations of fraud made by Chevron and [Pérez] & Veiga in 
other § 1782 actions and subsequently repeated in the media.‖  
Appellees Kohn‘s and KSG‘s br. at 3.   
As they said they would do, the Chevron applicants filed 
                                                                                                             
two requests, and the Ecuadorian Plaintiffs have submitted one.‖ 
 Appellant Republic of Ecuador‘s br. at 3.  In our opinion in In 
re Chevron, we indicated that Chevron had brought at least 25 
section 1782 requests.  633 F.3d at 159.  Overall, whatever is the 
correct number of section 1782 applications, this litigation must 
be unique in the annals of American judicial history. 
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the present section 1782 applications in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania on November 16, 2010, four days after Kohn and 
KSG filed their declaratory judgment action.  The Chevron 
applicants in their applications sought discovery from Kohn and 
KSG to support their contentions regarding fraudulent activity in 
the Lago Agrio litigation.  In particular, the applications sought 
documents in Kohn‘s file relating to that litigation and also 
sought an order allowing the Chevron applicants to depose 
Kohn.  Kohn‘s role in the underlying environmental litigation 
had been that of an attorney and financier for 16 years, from the 
inception of the initial class action suit in the Southern District 
of New York in 1993 until Kohn had a falling out with Donziger 
in 2009.  Indeed, it appears that he and his firm have expended 
millions of dollars in the prosecution of the Ecuadorian 
plaintiffs‘ claims. 
After the Chevron applicants filed their section 1782 
applications, the District Court placed the Kohn/KSG 
declaratory judgment action in civil suspense.  Kohn did not and 
does not object to producing the discovery the Chevron 
applicants are seeking, though he does maintain that if there was 
a crime or fraud committed in connection with the Lago Agrio 
litigation, he had no knowledge of or involvement in it.
8
  
Though Kohn and KSG are not averse to providing the 
discovery that the Chevron applicants have sought, they took no 
position in the District Court concerning the propriety of the 
                                                 
8
 Kohn‘s wishes in this respect are immaterial because the 
attorney-client privilege belongs to the client—in this litigation, 
the Ecuadorian plaintiffs—and not their attorney.  See In re 
Impounded Case, 879 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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discovery applications or the applicability of any evidentiary 
privileges.  They, however, voluntarily did produce an 833-page 
privilege log to all of the parties on December 6, 2010, an effort 
that Kohn and KSG state required ―hundreds of attorney hours 
reviewing and cataloging some 15,000-plus emails, 
approximately 40,000 pages of hard copy documents, and nearly 
5,000 electronically stored documents[.]‖  Id. at 5.  
Notwithstanding Kohn‘s neutral position in the District Court, 
there was opposition to the Chevron applicants‘ discovery 
applications because the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and the Republic 
of Ecuador intervened in that Court as interested parties and 
opposed the section 1782 applications.  They are the appellants 
in this appeal.   
 The evidence the Chevron applicants presented in the 
District Court in support of their contentions came primarily 
from discovery that they obtained as a result of successful 
section 1782 applications they filed in the Southern District of 
New York, particularly from outtakes during the production of 
Crude, the documentary chronicling the Lago Agrio litigation.  
The outtakes were recordings made in the preparation of the 
final film that were not used in the documentary and were many 
times longer than the film itself.  The Chevron applicants also 
introduced communications produced by Donziger, the lead 
American attorney for the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and who 
initiated the filming of Crude, in response to a prior section 
1782 discovery request.
9
  Kohn apparently was filmed for Crude 
                                                 
9
 In fact, the district court in the Southern District of New York 
granted the Chevron applicants nearly unfettered access to all of 
Donziger‘s communications related to the Lago Agrio litigation, 
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on three occasions, during and after meetings in Philadelphia on 
April 10, 2006, June 5, 2006, and January 31, 2007.
10
  He 
appears in the released version of the documentary for less than 
2 minutes, and, although we are not certain exactly how long he 
appears in the 600 hours of Crude outtakes, it is not a significant 
portion of that time, at least in a temporal sense, and, according 
to representations made at oral argument before us, likely was 
less than 2 hours. 
 Chevron suggests that Kohn‘s file has communications 
related to its allegation that support its contention that 
environmental consultants ghostwrote the global damages expert 
report that Richard Stalin Cabrera Vega, a purportedly neutral 
scientific expert, submitted to the Lago Agrio Court (the 
Cabrera report), and that Kohn financed the work of some of 
those consultants.
11
  Kohn denies that he had any knowledge of 
or involvement in ghostwriting the Cabrera report.  The Chevron 
applicants also allege that Kohn and the Ecuadorian plaintiffs 
                                                                                                             
in part because he failed to comply with discovery orders issued 
by that court.  See In re Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 170 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 
10
 Kohn claims that he was only filmed for the documentary 
twice, once in June 2006 and once in January 2007.  The exact 
number of times that Kohn was filmed makes no difference to 
our outcome.  
 
11
 The Cabrera report was of central importance in our prior 
opinion relating to the Lago Agrio litigation.  See In re Chevron 
Corp., 633 F.3d 153.   
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surreptitiously were involved in the institution of criminal 
prosecutions against Pérez and Veiga, which stem from a 
settlement and release agreement that Texaco entered into with 
the Republic of Ecuador in the mid-1990s, and contend that 
documents in Kohn‘s file will confirm their suspicions.  The 
parties‘ briefs describe the circumstances leading to the filing of 
criminal charges against Pérez and Veiga, and so we will 
synthesize those events, as well as the inferences the parties 
draw therefrom.   
As we have discussed, the Ecuadorian plaintiffs initially 
filed their environmental contamination case as a class action in 
the Southern District of New York.  While that case was 
pending, the Republic of Ecuador and TexPet entered into a 
1994 Memorandum of Understanding and a 1995 Settlement 
and Release Agreement whereby TexPet  
agreed to perform specified 
environmental remedial work in 
exchange for a release of claims by 
the Government of Ecuador and 
Petroecuador.  This release, granted 
to TexPet, Texaco, Inc., and other 
related companies, encompassed by 
its terms ‗all the Government‘s and 
Petroecuador‘s claims against the 
Releases for Environmental Impact 
arising from the Operations of the 
Consortium[.]‘ 
Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 
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334, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  In 1998 the Republic of Ecuador and 
Petroecuador executed a Final Release certifying that TexPet 
had performed the required remediation and had met its 
obligations under the 1995 Settlement and Release Agreement, 
and that by its terms they released ―TexPet and related 
companies from any liability and claims by the Government of 
the Republic of Ecuador, PETROECUADOR and its Affiliates, 
for items related to the obligations assumed by TEXPET in the 
1995 Settlement.‖  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 The parties dispute the legal impact of the 1998 Final 
Release.  The Chevron applicants argue that it bars the 
Ecuadorian plaintiffs from making any recovery in the Lago 
Agrio litigation; indeed, this contention has been one of 
Chevron‘s primary arguments in the Lago Agrio litigation, the 
BIT arbitration, and the Southern District of New York 
litigation.  The Ecuadorian plaintiffs contend, and the Republic 
of Ecuador agrees, that the Final Release, if valid at all, is valid 
only against the Republic and that it was not intended to release 
TexPet from liability for claims by third parties.  They point to 
the fact that the named parties to the Final Release negotiated it 
while the Aguinda case was pending, and argue that ―it is highly 
unlikely that a settlement entered into while Aguinda was 
pending would have neglected to mention the third-party claims 
being contemporaneously made in Aguinda if it had been 
intended to release those claims or to create an obligation to 
indemnify against them.‖  Id. at 374.  In its opinion 
accompanying its judgment that we described above awarding 
the Ecuadorian plaintiffs damages, the Lago Agrio Court 
expressed an understanding of the Final Release akin to those 
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that the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and the Republic of Ecuador 
advanced, reasoning that the Final Release only bound the 
government and not the Ecuadorian plaintiffs. 
 Whatever may have been the scope of the Final Release, 
the Ecuadorian Comptroller General in 1997 initiated an audit 
that continued until 2002, questioning the adequacy of TexPet‘s 
remediation, and raising the question of whether Ecuadorian 
officials and TexPet representatives had committed criminal 
offenses in certifying the adequacy of the remediation work 
leading to the execution of the 1998 Final Release.  The audit 
led to a criminal denuncia (complaint) by the Comptroller 
General‘s office in October 2003, which, in turn, triggered 
investigations into determining whether anyone was criminally 
liable for falsifying documents or committing environmental 
crimes in connection with the remediation and Final Release.  
The Prosecutor General of Ecuador began an investigation into 
the criminal complaint in 2004, but in 2006 the District 
Prosecutor found that the evidence was insufficient to pursue a 
criminal case against Pérez and Veiga. 
In April 2007, President Rafael Correa, who had been 
elected President of Ecuador in 2006, issued a press release 
urging the Office of the Prosecutor to initiate a prosecution of 
Petroecuador officials who signed off on TexPet‘s remediation 
efforts.  The following day he added that Chevron-Texaco 
attorneys involved in any fraudulent conduct also should be 
prosecuted.  On March 31, 2008, a new Prosecutor General 
reopened the criminal investigations of Pérez and Veiga on the 
basis of what was claimed to be newly discovered evidence, and 
the Prosecutor General issued an instrucción fiscal (prosecutor‘s 
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investigation report) on August 26, 2008.  Part of the criminal 
investigation of Pérez and Veiga included a June 2009 interview 
with Cabrera—the court-appointed expert in the Lago Agrio 
litigation who the Chevron applicants maintain conspired with 
the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and committed a fraud on the Lago 
Agrio Court by submitting a purportedly independent global 
damages assessment that, in actuality, the Ecuadorian plaintiffs 
ghostwrote—to discuss the remediation work that TexPet 
performed.  In April 2010, the Prosecutor General filed a 
dictamen fiscal (prosecutor‘s report), formally charging Pérez 
and Veiga, along with seven former Ecuadorian government 
officials, with criminal activity.   
 The Chevron applicants point primarily to two pieces of 
evidence that they claim demonstrate that the Ecuadorian 
plaintiffs colluded with the Republic of Ecuador in a plot to 
have criminal charges brought against Pérez and Veiga, and 
contend that the evidence links Kohn and KSG to that effort.  
First, the Chevron applicants refer to a discussion between Kohn 
and Donziger from the Crude outtakes on January 31, 2007, in 
which Donziger tells Kohn that the Ecuadorian plaintiffs‘ legal 
team submitted a report to the Ecuadorian Attorney General 
detailing their findings that Texaco had not completed the 
remediation work that the 1995 Settlement and Release 
Agreement required and that the 1998 Final Release said had 
been done.  Second, the Chevron applicants focus on a comment 
that Kohn made to Donziger in the course of the same 
discussion when Kohn said:  ―So, again, that may be something 
that we could facilitate going away at the right time . . . if 
[Chevron] wanted it to go away.‖  Appellee Chevron‘s br. at 22. 
 The parties disagree about what Kohn‘s reference meant when 
  22 
he made that comment, with the Chevron applicants contending 
that the comment indicated that an attorney for the Ecuadorian 
plaintiffs could cause the criminal charges against Pérez and 
Veiga to disappear in exchange for a settlement with Chevron, 
and Kohn maintaining that he merely was explaining that the 
report submitted to the Attorney General could be withdrawn if 
a settlement was reached, and that Chevron likely would require 
such a withdrawal as part of a global settlement. 
 On December 20, 2010, after a hearing during which the 
attorneys had an opportunity to advance their positions, the 
District Court granted the Chevron applicants the discovery that 
they requested in their section 1782 applications, basing its 
ruling primarily on the Crude outtakes.  The District Court 
found that the factors the Supreme Court in Intel Corp. v. 
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 124 S.Ct. 2466 
(2004), enunciated for consideration in a section 1782 
application were not an impediment to discovery in this case.  
The District Court then considered and rejected claims of 
privilege that the Ecuadorian plaintiffs raised, ruling that 
Donziger, in allowing the crew filming Crude intimate access to 
the proceedings in the Lago Agro litigation, effected a broad 
subject matter waiver of the attorney-client privilege for all of 
Kohn‘s communications related to that litigation.  The Court 
also ruled that the Republic of Ecuador had failed to bear its 
burden of demonstrating the applicability of the community-of-
interest doctrine.  Because the Court granted the Chevron 
applicants discovery of all of Kohn‘s communications related to 
the Lago Agrio litigation, it expressly declined to rule on the 
Chevron applicants‘ contention that the crime-fraud exception 
operated to vitiate the attorney-client privilege. 
  23 
 Appellants sought a stay of the discovery ruling, but the 
District Court denied their requests for both a one-week stay and 
a three-day stay.  The Court filed a written amplification of its 
December 20, 2010 opinion pursuant to Third Circuit Local 
Appellate Rule 3.1, explaining that time was of the essence
12
 
because a preliminary hearing on the criminal charges against 
Pérez and Veiga was scheduled in Ecuador for January 5, 
2011.
13
  The Court also explained that Pérez and Veiga had 
presented evidence that the Ecuadorian plaintiffs had some 
involvement in the initiation of the criminal prosecution against 
them. 
Appellants filed a motion in this Court for a stay pending 
appeal, or, in the alternative, for a temporary stay pending a 
hearing on their motion for a stay.  We granted a temporary stay 
on December 22, 2010, and heard oral arguments on the motion 
for a stay pending appeal on January 5, 2011, after which we 
granted appellants‘ motion for a stay pending appeal. 
                                                 
12
 The District Court recognized that the Chevron applicants had 
created some of the time exigency by waiting until November 
16, 2010, to file their section 1782 discovery applications.   
 
13
 The criminal preliminary hearing originally had been 
scheduled for November 10, 2010, and then was rescheduled for 
January 5, 2011.  At the January 5, 2011 oral argument before us 
on appellants‘ motion for a stay pending appeal, the parties 
informed us that the preliminary hearing had been postponed 
indefinitely.  Though it later was rescheduled for March 2, it 
was postponed yet again, and we are not aware of any new date. 
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III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1782, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
We review a district court‘s decision on a discovery request 
under section 1782 for an abuse of discretion.  In re Chevron 
Corp., 633 F.3d at 161.  ―However, if ‗the district court 
misinterpreted or misapplied the law,‘ or if ‗the court relied on 
inappropriate factors in the exercise of its discretion, our review 
is plenary.‘‖  Id. (quoting In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d 188, 191 (3d 
Cir. 1998)).  In this case we are exercising plenary review 
because we will hold that the District Court erred as a matter of 
law in granting the section 1782 applications. 
 
IV. PARTIES‘ ARGUMENTS 
 The District Court reasoned as follows in reaching its 
conclusion that the filming of Crude effected a broad subject 
matter waiver of the attorney-client privilege for all of Kohn‘s 
communications relating to the Lago Agrio litigation: 
[B]y inviting a documentary film 
crew to attend and record attorney 
meetings and other events where 
confidential matters were 
discussed, the Lago Agrio plaintiffs 
waived any otherwise applicable 
privilege or work-product 
protection for documents related to 
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the Lago Agrio Litigation.  The 
hundreds of hours of footage from 
the filming of Crude demonstrate 
that the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs 
arranged for the filmmakers to 
attend numerous attorney meetings 
and gave them broad access to 
information that would usually be 
treated as a confidential part of the 
attorney-client relationship. . . . 
The voluntary disclosure by 
a client of a privileged 
communication waives the 
privilege as to other such 
communications relating to the 
same subject matter made both 
prior to and after the occurrence of 
the waiver.  Murray v. Gemplus 
International, 217 F.R.D. 362, 367 
(E.D. Pa. 2003).  Under some 
circumstances, a party making a 
very limited intentional disclosure 
is entitled to a fairness balancing 
test to determine if that the waiver 
extends to related documents.  See, 
e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. 
Republic of Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 
1426 at n. 13 (3d Cir. 1991).  The 
Court concludes, however, that 
given the truly exceptional scope of 
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the waiver in this case, the Lago 
Agrio Plaintiffs are not entitled to 
such a balancing test.  To allow the 
Lago Agrio Plaintiffs to waive [the] 
privilege expansively for favorable 
documents and information as part 
of a calculated public relations 
campaign and then shield related 
documents behind the screen of 
privilege would be to permit the use 
of privilege and the work product 
doctrine as both sword and shield, 
an abuse that courts have 
discouraged.  See, e.g., Gemplus 
Int‘l, 217 F.R.D. at 367[.] 
In re Application of Chevron Corp., 2010 WL 5173279, at *7-8. 
 As we have indicated, the Ecuadorian appellants make 
the fundamental contention that ―the presence of strangers‖ 
during attorney meetings precluded the attorney-client privilege 
from attaching to what otherwise might be privileged 
communications.  Appellant Ecuadorian plaintiffs‘ br. at 23 n.7. 
 If that contention is correct, then the communications in the 
presence of the filmmakers never were privileged and thus there 
could not have been, in the words of the District Court, a 
―voluntary disclosure by a client of a privileged communication‖ 
and the District Court necessarily erred in reaching its result.   
Appellants also contend, relying on the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit‘s opinion in In re Von 
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Bulow, 828 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1987), that the District Court erred 
in conducting its waiver analysis because it failed to distinguish 
between the disclosure of communications ―made during a 
judicial proceeding and those disclosures made in an 
extrajudicial setting.‖  Appellant Ecuadorian plaintiffs‘ br. at 24. 
 In Von Bulow the court held that ―the extrajudicial disclosure 
of an attorney-client communication—one not subsequently 
used by the client in a judicial proceeding to his adversary‘s 
prejudice—does not waive the privilege as to the undisclosed 
portions of the communication.‖  Id. at 102.  The Von Bulow 
court reasoned that ―disclosures made in public rather than in 
court—even if selective—create no risk of legal prejudice until 
put at issue in the litigation by the privilege-holder[,]‖ and so in 
such cases ―there exists no reason in logic or equity to broaden 
the waiver beyond those matters actually revealed.‖  Id. at 103. 
According to appellants, the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and 
Donziger caused Crude to be filmed for public relations 
purposes, and not for use in litigation.  Indeed, appellants stress 
that the Chevron applicants, and not appellants, are utilizing 
Crude and its outtakes in litigation and the Chevron applicants 
are attempting to gain an advantage from the filming of Crude 
and its outtakes.  Appellants argue that because Crude contained 
only extrajudicial disclosures not intended to gain any advantage 
in the Lago Agrio litigation, if there was a public disclosure of 
privileged communications in the film, the disclosure would not 
justify a finding that there was a waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege for all communications in Kohn‘s file relating to the 
Lago Agrio litigation.  In this regard they point to Von Bulow, 
in which the court explained that ―[a]lthough it is true that 
disclosures in the public arena may be ‗one-sided‘ or 
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‗misleading‘, so long as such disclosures are and remain 
extrajudicial, there is no legal prejudice that warrants a broad 
court-imposed subject matter waiver.‖  Id. 
 The Chevron applicants argue that the touchstone of a 
waiver analysis is not whether the beneficiaries of the privilege 
disclosed the privileged information in court or in an 
extrajudicial setting, but rather fairness, and that it would be 
unfair to the Chevron applicants to allow the Ecuadorian 
plaintiffs selectively to disclose privileged information.
14
  
Moreover, the Chevron applicants contend that ―the very aim of 
the disclosures Plaintiffs made in Crude was to influence the 
litigation in Ecuador,‖  Appellees Pérez‘s and Veiga‘s br. at 46, 
and that ―the obvious purpose of the film was to gain an 
advantage in the Lago Agrio litigation by generating public 
support for Plaintiffs and putting pressure on Chevron to pay a 
future judgment or to offer a generous settlement.‖  Appellee 
Chevron‘s br. at 36.  Thus, according to the Chevron applicants, 
                                                 
14
 The Chevron applicants claim that appellants abandoned any 
argument regarding the broad scope of the District Court‘s 
privilege ruling because they did not raise the issue in that 
Court, and also claim that appellants lack standing to challenge 
that Court‘s privilege rulings.  We reject the Chevron 
applicants‘ contentions.  The Ecuadorian plaintiffs raised the 
issue in the District Court, both in their brief and at oral 
argument.  See App. at 1347, 1829, 1863.  And, because the 
Ecuadorian plaintiffs are the clients to whom the privilege 
belongs, they clearly have standing to challenge the District 
Court‘s privilege rulings.      
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because the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and their representatives 
selectively disclosed privileged communication to gain a 
strategic advantage in litigation, the District Court correctly 
ruled that that disclosure effected a broad subject-matter waiver 
of all of Kohn‘s privileged communications relating to the Lago 
Agrio litigation.  
 
V. DISCUSSION 
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege and Waiver 
 The Chevron applicants‘ arguments, and the District 
Court‘s opinion, presuppose that the attorney-client privilege 
protected the material in Crude and its outtakes from disclosure, 
for only if there was such a protection could the disclosure of 
that material waive the attorney-client privilege protecting 
Kohn‘s file.15  Thus, our initial inquiry necessarily is whether 
                                                 
15
 We realize that the question of whether the attorney-client 
privilege protected the material in Crude and its outtakes was 
raised only obliquely, if at all, in the District Court.  
Nevertheless, we can consider the question on this appeal, for 
we long have recognized that we can exercise discretion to 
consider matters on appeal not raised in a district court ―if ‗the 
public interest or justice so warrants[.]‘‖  Galena v. Leone, 638 
F.3d 186, 202 n.13 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Appalachian State 
Low-Level Radiation Comm‘n v. Pena, 126 F.3d 193, 196 (3d 
Cir. 1997)).  Here we are considering the question of whether 
the attorney-client 
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the Crude material was privileged in the first place.  In order for 
the attorney-client privilege to attach to a communication, ―it 
must be ‗(1) a communication (2) made between privileged 
persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or 
providing legal assistance for the client.‘‖  In re Teleglobe 
Commc‘ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 359 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 68 (2000)).  We explained with respect to the 
third requirement in Teleglobe that ―if persons other than the 
client, its attorney, or their agents are present, the 
communication is not made in confidence, and the privilege 
does not attach.‖  Id. at 361.  Here, the communications captured 
on film clearly were not made ―in confidence‖ due to the 
presence of the filmmakers at the time of the communications, 
and so the protections of the attorney-client privilege never 
attached to those communications.
16
  In such a scenario the 
                                                                                                             
privilege protected the material disclosed in the filming of 
Crude.  Unless we do so, we will decide the case incorrectly; if 
the Crude material was not privileged, revealing the material, 
including attorneys‘ discussions, simply could not waive the 
privilege shielding other material, i.e., the material in Kohn‘s 
file.   
 
16The Chevron applicants do not contend that the filmmakers 
should be regarded as ―agents‖ of the Ecuadorian plaintiffs so 
that the attorney-client privilege could attach to communications 
in their presence.  See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of 
the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1424 (3d Cir. 1991).  Of course, if the 
filmmakers were ―agents‖ of the Ecuadorian plaintiffs necessary 
to the litigation, then the disclosure of information to them 
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waiver argument advanced by the Chevron applicants is 
unavailing because, inasmuch as the communications were not 
protected by the attorney-client privilege, there was no risk of a 
litigant using the privilege as both a sword and a shield in an 
effort to gain an advantage in litigation, and thus there is no role 
for a court to play as arbiter of notions of ―fairness.‖17   
                                                                                                             
would not have been a disclosure to a stranger and the disclosure 
could not have waived the attorney-client privileges for other 
material.   
  
17
 Of course, we recognize that in a typical case the difference 
between a finding that a communication was not privileged in 
the first place, and a finding that a communication was 
privileged but that the privilege was waived by subsequent 
disclosure of that communication to a third party, will be 
meaningless, because in a typical case a party is seeking to 
discover the communication in issue, and in either scenario the 
communication in issue will be discoverable because it is not 
protected by the attorney-client privilege.  Here, however, the 
Chevron applicants are not seeking to discover the 
communications in issue, as they already have access to the 
Crude outtakes as a result of an earlier successful section 1782 
application.  Rather, the Chevron applicants are attempting to 
use the Crude outtakes as a means to effectuate a broad subject 
matter waiver of the entirety of Kohn‘s communications related 
to the Lago Agrio litigation.  Because the basis for their position 
is that the Ecuadorian plaintiffs selectively disclosed privileged 
communications in Crude to gain an advantage in litigation, it 
matters that the communications in Crude and its outtakes were 
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 This case is distinguishable from our prior decision in In 
re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153.  There, the attorney-client 
privilege covered the communications in issue because they 
were made in confidence between privileged persons for the 
purpose of providing legal assistance.  We held that by later 
disclosing those initially privileged communications to a third 
party—the court-appointed expert Cabrera—the Ecuadorian 
plaintiffs waived any claims of attorney-client privilege as to 
those communications.  Here, on the other hand, because the 
communications were not made ―in confidence‖ due to the 
presence of the Crude filmmakers, they were not privileged to 
begin with, and there was no privilege to waive by their 
disclosure.  Accordingly, there is no justification for finding any 
waiver of the attorney-client privilege for Kohn‘s 
communications relating to the Lago Agrio litigation on the 
basis of disclosures made during the filming of Crude and its 
outtakes, even if those disclosures were selective, given that the 
communications disclosed were not privileged when made.     
 For that reason, we are constrained to reverse the District 
Court‘s December 20, 2010 order granting the Chevron 
applicants‘ application for discovery pursuant to section 1782.18 
                                                                                                             
not covered by the attorney-client privilege, because the risk of a 
party using the privilege both as a sword and a shield by 
selectively disclosing communications to gain an advantage in 
litigation simply does not exist when the selectively disclosed 
communications were not privileged when made. 
 
18
 As far as we can ascertain from their briefs and oral 
arguments, the Chevron applicants do not present any arguments 
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 Because we will reverse the Court‘s order granting the 
applications, it is not necessary for us to address most of the 
other issues the parties raise on this appeal, including the 
applicability of the community-of-interest doctrine,
19
 and we 
decline to offer our views with respect to those issues as they 
would be mere obiter dictum. 
B. The Crime-Fraud Exception 
The Chevron applicants maintain, however, that the 
record provides a sufficient basis to affirm the District Court‘s 
determination that there was a broad subject matter waiver of 
the attorney-client privilege for all of Kohn‘s communications 
related to the Lago Agrio litigation on the alternative ground 
that application of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-
client privilege eliminated the protection of Kohn‘s 
communications related to the Lago Agrio litigation.  The 
                                                                                                             
on appeal in support of their contention that the attorney-client 
privilege does not cover Kohn‘s communications relating to the 
Lago Agrio litigation in addition to their aforementioned waiver 
contention, which we reject, and the applicability of the crime-
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, which we 
address below. 
 
19
 Inasmuch as the communications disclosed were not 
privileged, it is obvious that we need not address the 
community-of-interest doctrine, which protects the 
confidentiality of privileged communications shared by parties 
with common legal interests against a common adversary.  See 
In re Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 366. 
  34 
Chevron applicants assert that if we remand the matter to the 
District Court for consideration of the crime-fraud exception, 
the remand will be a waste of time and resources because the 
District Court already indicated that it believed that the crime-
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege is applicable 
here.  In discussing its decision with the parties on December 
20, 2010, following the Court having rendered its opinion after 
the hearing, the Court stated that 
if an appeal is taken . . . I will 
consider writing a supplemental 
opinion on crime fraud, which I 
don‘t think the appellants would be 
very happy with.  In other words, I 
don‘t think that would, well, I 
know it would not, in any way, 
shape or form, change my ruling.  It 
would expand the basis for the 
ruling and would give the Court of 
Appeals more, well, more law to 
analyze, but I don‘t think that‘s 
necessary.  Not on the present state 
of the record, because I think my 
opinion, based on disclosure to 
third parties is well founded.  I 
share that with you. 
If it is perceived as an 
attempt to chill an appeal, yes, 
that‘s exactly what I have in mind, 
because I think this litigation ought 
  35 
to go forward with the discovery 
that the Kohn firm has, I don‘t want 
to say agreed to, but pretty much 
agreed to. 
App. at 1908. 
Though the Chevron applicants are correct that the 
District Court made it clear that it believed that the crime-fraud 
exception to the attorney-client privilege was applicable to the 
Kohn communications, the Court ultimately did not rule that the 
exception applied.  In the circumstances, because a 
determination of whether the crime-fraud exception is applicable 
is not purely a legal question, but rather requires a fact sensitive 
inquiry involving the exercise of discretion, we believe that the 
District Court should consider the crime-fraud exception issue in 
the first instance and we decline the Chevron applicants‘ 
invitation to decide at this time whether the exception is 
applicable.  See Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortg. Corp., 
142 F.3d 151, 159 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that ―[w]hen the 
resolution of an issue requires the exercise of discretion or fact 
finding,‖ and the trial court did not reach the issue, ―it is 
inappropriate and unwise for an appellate court‖ to do so in the 
first instance).  
Notwithstanding our determination not to decide whether 
the crime-fraud exception is applicable, we think it prudent to 
observe, given the current state of the record and the District 
Court‘s comments on December 20, 2010, that it is not clear that 
the Chevron applicants have met their burden of establishing a 
prima facie case that the exception is applicable with respect to 
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Kohn‘s otherwise privileged communications.  In this regard, 
we make the following comments for the District Court to 
consider on remand.      
 A party invoking the crime-fraud exception in an attempt 
to vitiate the attorney-client privilege 
must make a prima facie showing 
that (1) the client was committing 
or intending to commit a fraud or 
crime, and (2) the attorney-client 
communications were in 
furtherance of that alleged crime or 
fraud.  A prima facie showing 
requires presentation of evidence 
which, if believed by the fact-
finder, would be sufficient to 
support a finding that the elements 
of the crime-fraud exception were 
met. 
In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d at 166 (quoting In re Grand Jury 
Investigation, 445 F.3d 266, 274 (3d Cir. 2006)).  Though the 
Chevron applicants present evidence that they claim 
demonstrates a fraud or crime in the prosecution of the Lago 
Agrio litigation, in our prior opinion we clarified that  
evidence of a crime or fraud, no 
matter how compelling, does not by 
itself satisfy both elements of the 
crime-fraud exception to the 
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attorney-client privilege because to 
establish the second element of the 
exception the party seeking to 
circumvent the privilege by 
invoking the exception bears the 
burden of making a prima facie 
showing that there were 
communications between the client 
and attorney in furtherance of that 
fraud.   
Id. at 166-67.  In order to make a prima facie showing that the 
communications they seek from Kohn were made in furtherance 
of the alleged crime or fraud, the Chevron applicants would 
have to link Kohn himself to the purported fraud or crime, and 
so it will be insufficient solely to present evidence that other 
individuals involved with or representing the Ecuadorian 
plaintiffs were engaged in a fraud or crime without Kohn‘s 
involvement. 
 The Chevron applicants present two bases for invoking 
the crime-fraud exception.  The first theory is that Kohn was 
involved in having environmental consultants ghostwrite the 
Cabrera report that was submitted into evidence in the Lago 
Agrio litigation.  This theory is essentially the same claim that 
we discussed in our prior opinion in In re Chevron Corp., 633 
F.3d 153, although in that case Chevron sought section 1782 
discovery from one of the environmental consulting firms and 
its employees, and here the Chevron applicants seek discovery 
from Kohn.  Consequently, to circumvent the attorney-client 
privilege with respect to Kohn the Chevron applicants will need 
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to link him to any alleged fraud.  Appellants noted at oral 
argument that the Lago Agrio Court found that there had been 
no demonstration that there had been fraud committed in the 
preparation of the Cabrera report, and the court expressly 
declined to consider the Cabrera report in reaching its judgment. 
 Appellants contended at oral argument that we should give 
those findings by the Lago Agrio Court preclusive effect, and 
that the findings bar the Chevron applicants‘ fraud claims with 
respect to the Cabrera report.   
The Lago Agrio Court wrote the following:  
[A] review of the case file shows 
that there have been no defects in 
the appointment of expert Cabrera, 
or in the delivery of his report.  
There are no legal grounds 
whatsoever for quashing either his 
appointment or his expert report.  It 
should be stressed that this issue 
has been resolved on several prior 
occasions, and no new evidence has 
been submitted that would suggest 
the existence of any grounds for 
quashing that appointment or expert 
opinion.
20
 
                                                 
20
 Of course, the Lago Agrio Court wrote its opinion in Spanish, 
so we are quoting a translation of the opinion. 
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Appellee Chevron‘s February 24, 2011 Rule 28(j) letter at 50.21  
But, even though the Lago Agrio Court found that there was no 
legal basis for excluding the Cabrera report from evidence, it 
declined to consider the Cabrera report in reaching its judgment. 
 See id. at 51.  Furthermore, the Lago Agrio Court issued an 
order on March 4, 2011, in response to Chevron‘s motion for 
clarification and expansion of its initial judgment, in which it 
reiterated that  
the Court decided to refrain entirely 
from relying on Expert Cabrera‘s 
report when rendering judgment.  If 
[Chevron] feels that it has been 
harmed because the Court refused 
to void the entire case against it in 
response to the alleged fraud in 
Expert Cabrera‘s expert 
assessment, which is allegedly 
demonstrated by those videos, the 
Court reminds the defendant that its 
motion was granted, and that the 
report had NO bearing on the 
decision.  So even if there was 
fraud, it could not cause any harm 
to the defendant.  The Court has 
safeguarded the integrity of the 
proceeding and the administration 
                                                 
21
 We are treating the Lago Agrio Court‘s opinion as part of 
Chevron‘s Rule 28(j) letter, as Chevron supplied the opinion 
with its letter. 
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of justice.  
 
Appellant Ecuadorian plaintiffs‘ March 11, 2011 Rule 28(j) 
letter at 8.  We will leave it to the District Court to determine, in 
the first instance, whether the Lago Agrio Court‘s findings are 
entitled to issue preclusive or claim preclusive effect given the 
surrounding circumstances, and whether the Chevron applicants‘ 
claim remains viable inasmuch as the Lago Agrio Court did not 
consider the Cabrera report in issuing its judgment.  
 The second theory that the Chevron applicants present to 
invoke the crime-fraud exception is that Kohn was involved 
surreptitiously in having criminal charges brought against Pérez 
and Veiga in an effort to pressure Chevron into settling the case. 
 As we mentioned  previously, the Chevron applicants point to a 
conversation between Kohn and Donziger on January 31, 2007, 
that was filmed for Crude.  In that discussion, Donziger informs 
Kohn that the Ecuadorian plaintiffs‘ legal team submitted a 
report to the Ecuadorian Attorney General detailing its findings 
that the remediation work that TexPet performed was not 
completed as required by the 1995 Settlement and Release 
Agreement and reflected in the 1998 Final Release.  However, 
as Kohn and KSG pointed out in their District Court brief, the 
Ecuadorian plaintiffs‘ 
submission of their findings to the 
Ecuador Attorney General is no 
different than what Chevron has 
done recently – turned over 
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materials it has gathered in the 
course of its 1782 actions to the 
United States Department of 
Justice. . . .  Just as the DOJ is free 
to do whatever it deems appropriate 
with the information Chevron has 
provided, the Attorney General of 
Ecuador was free to do as it thought 
appropriate with any information 
provided by plaintiffs. 
App. at 1236 n.10.   
It is also significant that the Ecuadorian plaintiffs 
submitted the report to the Attorney General of Ecuador, whose 
jurisdiction extends only to civil matters, and, although the 
Attorney General of Ecuador forwarded the report to the United 
States Department of Justice, it is unclear whether the report 
ever was submitted to the Ecuadorian Prosecutor General, who 
has jurisdiction over criminal matters.
22
  Likewise, we do not 
                                                 
22
 We recognize that on July 31, 2008, Donziger and other 
representatives of the Ecuadorian plaintiffs held a press 
conference during which it was commented that they had 
presented evidence to the Ecuadorian Prosecutor General‘s 
office, but it is unclear whether that comment referred to the 
report mentioned by Donziger in his January 31, 2007 
discussion with Kohn, and that report is the only connection that 
the Chevron applicants have drawn between Kohn and the 
criminal charges against Pérez and Veiga. 
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view the circumstance to which Perez and Veiga point, that 
Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa appointed a friend of his as 
Prosecutor General, and that following this appointment the 
criminal investigation of Pérez and Veiga was reopened—a fact 
stressed by counsel for Pérez and Veiga at oral argument—as 
probative.  After all, presidential transitions in the United States 
also typically include the replacement of high-level officials, 
oftentimes with persons who are friends, or have an even closer 
relationship to the incoming president, and it is not uncommon 
to see a shift in priorities along with a change in the presidential 
administration.
23
  Moreover, it is not uncommon for an 
American president to comment on ongoing criminal 
prosecutions and even urge that alleged wrongdoers be 
prosecuted in accord with the president‘s priorities.   
The Chevron applicants also highlight a comment that 
Kohn made to Donziger in the course of the same conversation 
when Kohn said:  ―So, again, that may be something that we 
                                                 
23
 This reality was recognized at a hearing before the Committee 
on the Judiciary of the United States Senate on July 12, 1968, 
when Senator Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois commented at 
length on presidents‘ appointments of persons to whom he was 
close to the United States Supreme Court, and said that ―[y]ou 
do not go out looking for an enemy to put him on the Court, or 
somebody whose views are so divergent that you could not 
countenance them for a minute.‖  Nominations of Abe Fortas 
and Homer Thornberry: Hearings Before the Committee on the 
Judiciary of the United States Senate, 90th Cong. 53 (1968) 
(statement of Sen. Everett M. Dirksen, Member, S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary).  We doubt that the comment shocked anyone. 
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could facilitate going away at the right time . . . if [Chevron] 
wanted it to go away.‖  Appellee Chevron‘s br. at 22.  As we 
outlined previously, the parties advance differing interpretations 
of the focus of Kohn‘s remarks.  The Chevron applicants 
contend that Kohn was referring to an ability to make the 
criminal charges against Pérez and Veiga disappear in exchange 
for a settlement agreement with Chevron.  Kohn maintains that 
the statement did not refer to making a criminal investigation or 
criminal charges go away, but, instead, merely referred to 
withdrawing the report that the Ecuadorian plaintiffs had 
submitted to the Attorney General of Ecuador.  Kohn states that 
if a settlement was reached, Chevron likely would require a 
global settlement that included the cessation of all 
communications with the Ecuadorian Attorney General.  We 
note that the discussion in issue between Kohn and Donziger 
was on January 31, 2007, President Correa did not appoint a 
new Prosecutor General until late-2007, and the criminal 
investigation into Pérez and Veiga was not reopened until March 
2008.  Indeed, Pérez and Veiga were not charged with any 
crimes until 2010, a circumstance which tends to suggest that 
Kohn was referring to the report, and not to criminal charges 
that would not issue for another three years.  Overall, we are 
satisfied that inasmuch as the applicability of the crime-fraud 
exception raises factual issues, we should leave it to the District 
Court to decide any issues relating to Kohn‘s statement on 
remand.   
 In explaining our analysis of the fraud issue, we 
acknowledge the seriousness of the fraud that the Chevron 
applicants have alleged has been involved in this litigation.  In 
addition to an Ecuadorian court entering a massive judgment 
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against Chevron, the liberty of two individuals may be at stake.  
Yet the circumstances supporting the claim of fraud largely are 
allegations and allegations are not factual findings.  
Furthermore, the Chevron applicants are asking that American 
courts make a finding that the attorneys in a civil case in 
Ecuador can control the Ecuadorian criminal justice system.  
Though it is obvious that the Ecuadorian judicial system is 
different from that in the United States, those differences 
provide no basis for disregarding or disparaging that system.  
American courts, though justifiably proud of our system, should 
understand that other countries may organize their judicial 
systems as they see fit. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 Because the presence of the filmmakers prevented the 
attorney-client privilege from ever attaching to the 
communications filmed for Crude, there was no basis for finding 
that the communications effectuated a subject matter waiver of 
the attorney-client privilege for Kohn‘s communications related 
to the Lago Agrio litigation.  Consequently, we will reverse the 
District Court‘s December 20, 2010 order granting the Chevron 
applicants‘ 28 U.S.C. § 1782 discovery applications and will 
remand the matter for the District Court to consider the parties‘ 
arguments regarding the applicability of the crime-fraud 
exception to the attorney-client privilege. 
